NASH Equilibrium in Lower Probabilities
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- Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard Schipper, 2008.
"Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 333-362, March.
- Burkhard C. Schipper & Juergen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2006. "Granny versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games," Working Papers 627, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
- Thomas Jungbauer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "Strategic games beyond expected utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 377-398, October.
- Ghirardato, Paolo & Le Breton, Michel, 2000.
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 277-285, February.
- GHIRARDATO, Paolo & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Choquet rationality," CORE Discussion Papers 1999012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- GHIRARDATO, Paolo & LE BRETON, Michel, 2000. "Choquet rationality," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1447, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa, 2000. "A notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under knightian uncertainty," FGV/EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 376, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Joseph Greenberg, 2000. "The Right to Remain Silent," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 193-204, March.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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