Causal Assessment in Finite-length Extensive-Form Games
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- White, Halbert & Xu, Haiqing & Chalak, Karim, 2014.
"Causal discourse in a game of incomplete information,"
Journal of Econometrics,
Elsevier, vol. 182(1), pages 45-58.
- Halbert White & Haiqing Xu & Karim Chalak, 2011. "Causal Discourse in a Game of Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 130912, The University of Texas at Austin, Department of Economics.
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