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Dynamic Consistency in Extensive form Decision Problems

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  • Nicola Dimitri

Abstract

In a stimulating paper Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she exhibits a particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such imperfection obtains whenever an information set includes histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the Absentminded Driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main theorem of this paper provides a general result of dynamically consistent choices, valid for a large class of finite extensive form decision problems without nature.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Dimitri, 2005. "Dynamic Consistency in Extensive form Decision Problems," Department of Economics University of Siena 455, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  • Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:455
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    File URL: http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/455.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jude Kline, J., 2002. "Minimum Memory for Equivalence between Ex Ante Optimality and Time-Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 278-305, February.
    2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "Dynamic Consistency and Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 31-50, July.
    3. Lipman, Barton L., 1997. "More Absentmindedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 97-101, July.
    4. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
    5. Modica, Salvatore & Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 265-298, May.
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak, 1997. "A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 25-30, July.
    7. Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman & Aldo Rustichini, 1998. "Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(1), pages 159-174, January.
    8. Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
    9. Sáez-Martí, María & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Discounting and Future Selves," Working Paper Series 575, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    10. Hans Hvide, 1999. "Bounds to Memory Loss," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 1-21, February.
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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