Inducing imperfect recall in the lab
Our paper provides a procedure to induce imperfect recall in the laboratory, even though in the past it has been claimed that this is difficult to achieve in a controlled environment. To accomplish this task we rely on a technique called divided attention to impair subject recollection of previous choices in a version of the absent-minded driver game of Piccione and Rubinstein [Piccione, M., Rubinstein, A., 1997a. On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior 20, 3-24]. The results suggest that a substantial number of subjects experience imperfect recall yet still behave in a rational manner. The observed behavior is consistent with a large portion of the subjects falling prey to the temporal paradox as suggested by Piccione and Rubinstein [Piccione, M., Rubinstein, A., 1997a. On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall. Games and Economic Behavior 20, 3-24].
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A., 1996.
"The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses,"
39-96, Tel Aviv.
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 121-130, July.
- Lipman, Barton L., 1997. "More Absentmindedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 97-101, July.
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997.
"On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
- Burnham, Terence & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L., 2000. "Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-73, September.
- David J Cooper & John B Van Huyck, 2002.
"Evidence on the Equivalence of the Stratetic and Extensive Form Representation of Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
234936000000000001, David K. Levine.
- Cooper, David J. & Van Huyck, John B., 2003. "Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 290-308, June.
- James C. Cox & Cary A. Deck, 2005. "On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 623-635, July.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Forgetful Passenger," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 117-120, July.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:69:y:2009:i:1:p:64-74. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.