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Multiplayer belief revision

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Abstract

One main topic of the epistemic program of game theory deals with the value of information. To study this question in a broad context, one needs to adapt some of the tools used in multiplayer epistemic logic. A hierarchical belief structure is introduced both in a syntactical and semantical framework. In the same framework, a generalized notion of message is characterized by its content and its status. For a given message, a multiplayer belief revision rule that transforms any initial belief structure into a final belief one is designed. A representation theorem relates syntactical axioms to the belief revision rule.

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  • Antoine Billot & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Bernard Walliser, 2008. "Multiplayer belief revision," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne v08067, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:v08067
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    Keywords

    Belief revision; message; epistemic logic.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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