Four Logics for Minimal Belief Revision
It is natural to think of belief revision as the interaction of belief and information over time. Thus branching-time temporal logic seems a natural setting for a theory of belief revision. We propose a logic based on three modal operators: a belief operator, an information operator and a next-time operator. Four logics of increasing strength are proposed. The first is a logic that captures the most basic notion of minimal belief revision. The second characterizes the qualitative content of Bayes' rule. The third provides an axiomatization of the AGM theory of belief revision and the fourth provides a characterization of the notion of plausibility ordering of the set of possible worlds.
|Date of creation:||12 Apr 2007|
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- Oliver Board, 2002.
"Dynamic Interactive Epistemology,"
Economics Series Working Papers
125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- E. Ray Canterbery, 1984. "Introduction," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 7(1), pages 4-6, October.
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