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Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab

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  • Kandel, Emanuel
  • Mugerman, Yevgeny
  • Winter, Eyal

Abstract

We investigate subjects’ decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose whether or not to learn (at no cost) which game was being played. This choice was communicated to the other player before the actual game was played. Our results indicate that subjects understand the potential negative value of information in interactive contexts; specifically, they recognize that forgoing information can induce their counterpart to play more cooperatively. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the observed tendency to forgo information aligns with the predictions of rational behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Kandel, Emanuel & Mugerman, Yevgeny & Winter, Eyal, 2025. "Strategic commitment to forgo information: Evidence from the lab," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 401-414.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:401-414
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.01.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Games; Strategic commitment; Value of information; Forgoing information; Interactive decision-making;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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