The Not-So-Absent-Minded Driver
This paper starts with a re-examination of Piccione and Rubinstein`s Absent-Minded Driver problem, and suggests a novel interpretation of Aumann, Hart and Perry`s notion of action-optimality. We then consider several variants of the original problem in which the assumption that the player`s information sets partition the set of his decision nodes is relaxed. This relaxation enables us to construct a counter-example to Piccione and Rubinstein`s result that planning-optimal strategies are always action-optimal. We also show that an agent with more information may do worse than an agent with less.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2003|
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- Aumann, Robert J. & Hart, Sergiu & Perry, Motty, 1997. "The Absent-Minded Driver," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 102-116, July.
- Halpern, Joseph Y., 1997. "On Ambiguities in the Interpretation of Game Trees," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 66-96, July.
- Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1995.
"On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 324-324, December.
- Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
- Oliver Board, 2002. "The Deception of the Greeks: Generalizing the Information Structure of Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 137, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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