Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games
There exist three equivalent definitions of perfect Nash equilibria which differ in the way "best responses against small perturbations" are defined. It is shown that applying the spirit of these definitions to rationalizability leads to three different refinements of rationalizable strategies which are termed perfect (Bernheim, 1984), weakly perfect and trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, respectively. We prove that weakly perfect rationalizability is weaker than both perfect and proper (Schuhmacher, 1995) rationalizability and in two-player games it is weaker than trembling-hand perfect rationalizability. By means of examples, it is shown that no other relationships can be found.
Volume (Year): 28 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: January 1997/final version: August 1998|
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- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, March.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
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