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Social Rationalizability

  • Herings P. Jean-Jacques
  • Mauleon Ana
  • Vannetelbosch J.

    (METEOR)

Social environments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both non-cooperative and cooperative games. We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for social environments and propose a new concept called social rationalizability. The concept aims to identify the consequences of common knowledge of rationality and farsightedness within the framework of social environments. The set of socially rationalizable outcomes is shown to be non-empty for all social environments and it can be computed by an iterative reduction procedure. We introduce a definition of coalitional rationality for social environments and show that it is satisfied by social rationalizability.

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Paper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 009.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2000009
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  1. HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & ANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1378, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
  3. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
  4. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1432, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  6. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
  7. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1421, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
  9. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
  10. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  11. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  12. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
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