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On solving multi-type line planning problems

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  • Goossens, J.H.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • van Hoesel, C.P.M.

    (Quantitative Economics)

  • Kroon, L.G.

    (Externe publicaties SBE)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Goossens, J.H.M. & van Hoesel, C.P.M. & Kroon, L.G., 2002. "On solving multi-type line planning problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  • Handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2002009
    DOI: 10.26481/umamet.2002009
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1972. "Cooperative games in effectiveness form," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 88-101, August.
    2. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(2), pages 353-371.
    3. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    4. Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 111-138, October.
    5. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 1999. "Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(1), pages 53-68.
    6. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    8. Mariotti, Marco, 1997. "A Model of Agreements in Strategic Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 196-217, May.
    9. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
    10. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    11. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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