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Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

Author

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  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings
  • Ana Mauleon
  • Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Abstract

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, 2004. "Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 519-531, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:519-531
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820400174
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    C72; C78; D61; coordination games; coordination failures; rationalizability; matching devices;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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