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Revealing the preferences of the FARC

Author

Listed:
  • Andrés Zambrano
  • Hernando Zuleta

Abstract

Currently the FARC and the Colombian Government are negotiating a peace agreement in the city of Havana in Cuba. Although the results of these talks are uncertain and the final goal of the rebels is not observable, it is possible to analyze their strategy under different scenarios and associate the actions undertaken by the insurgents with their real willingness to cease violence. We model the strategy of an insurgent group that follows a pattern of prolonged popular war but negotiates with the government. The main results of the model are the following: (i) If the marginal probability of signing a peace treaty is significantly low when the guerrilla invests little on non-violent strategies, then they will continue to fight and allocate all its resources on military power. (ii) If the guerrillas value political participation as they value a complete revolution, and the depreciation of its military power is higher than the budget they can allocate; then the optimal strategy is to avoid military confrontation and devote all the resources to sign a peace treaty. (iii) By increasing its military power the government can generate a change in the strategy of the rebels and, particularly, a reduction in the budget allocated to military power.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Zambrano & Hernando Zuleta, 2016. "Revealing the preferences of the FARC," Documentos CEDE 14572, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000089:014572
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic conflict; negotiation strategies; guerrilla; FARC; utility functions.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean

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