IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v23y2017i2p7n1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions

Author

Listed:
  • Zambrano Andrés

    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)

  • Zuleta Hernando

    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia)

Abstract

We model the strategy of an insurgent group that follows a pattern of prolonged popular war but negotiates with the government. The main results of the model are the following: (i) If the marginal probability of signing a peace treaty is significantly low when the guerrilla invests little on non-violent strategies, then they will continue to fight and allocate all its resources on military power. (ii) Ceteris paribus, the future stock of military power of a guerrilla is increasing in their current military power and its budget. (iii) The greater the government’s military power, the lower the share of resources guerrillas allocate to violent strategies. We also provide two examples of negotiation processes between the Colombian government and FARC, and relate it to our theoretical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Zambrano Andrés & Zuleta Hernando, 2017. "Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(2), pages 1-7, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:23:y:2017:i:2:p:7:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0039
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0039
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/peps-2016-0039?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daniel Mej�a & Carlos Esteban Posada, 2003. "Capital Destruction, Optimal Defense and Economic Growth," Borradores de Economia 2096, Banco de la Republica.
    2. Andonova Veneta & Zuleta Hernando, 2009. "Beyond Moral Hazard: The Effect of Firm-Level Compensation Strategies on Economic Conflict," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 15(1), pages 79-101, October.
    3. Arias María Alejandra & Ibáñez Ana María & Querubin Pablo, 2014. "The Desire to Return during Civil War: Evidence for Internally Displaced Populations in Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 209-233, January.
    4. Powell, Robert, 1996. "Bargaining in the Shadow of Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 255-289, August.
    5. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 123-133, February.
    6. Alvaro J. Riascos & Juan F. Vargas, 2011. "Violence and growth in colombia: a review of the quantitative literature," Documentos de Trabajo 8806, Universidad del Rosario.
    7. Vargas Juan F. & Caruso Raul, 2014. "Conflict, Crime, and Violence in Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-4, January.
    8. Lemus Natalia, 2014. "Conflict-Induced Poverty: Evidence from Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 113-142, January.
    9. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 2011. "A New Model for Predicting Policy Choices," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(1), pages 65-87, February.
    10. Fearon, James D., 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(3), pages 577-592, September.
    11. Blanco Mariana & Vargas Juan F., 2014. "Can SMS Technology Improve Low Take-up of Social Benefits?," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 61-81, January.
    12. Alvaro J. Riascos & Juan F. Vargas, 2011. "Violence and growth in Colombia: A review of the quantitative literature," Economics of Peace and Security Journal, EPS Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 15-20, July.
    13. repec:uwe:journl:v:6:y:2011:i:2:p:15-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sigifredo Laengle & Gino Loyola & David Tobón-Orozco, 2020. "Bargaining under polarization: The case of the Colombian armed conflict," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(4), pages 551-563, July.
    2. Morales, Juan S., 2021. "Legislating during war: Conflict and politics in Colombia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andr√©s Zambrano & Hernando Zuleta, 2016. "Revealing the preferences of the FARC," Documentos CEDE 14572, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    2. Adriana Camacho & Catherine Rodriguez, 2013. "Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(1), pages 89-116, February.
    3. David Tingle, 2015. "Bargaining Practice and Negotiation Failure in Russia-Ukraine Gas Relations," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1504, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Adriana Camacho & Catherine Rodriguez, 2013. "Firm Exit and Armed Conflict in Colombia," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(1), pages 89-116, February.
    5. Enrique Leonardo Kato Vidal, 2015. "Violence in Mexico: An economic rationale of crime and its impacts," EconoQuantum, Revista de Economia y Finanzas, Universidad de Guadalajara, Centro Universitario de Ciencias Economico Administrativas, Departamento de Metodos Cuantitativos y Maestria en Economia., vol. 12(2), pages 93-108, Julio-Dic.
    6. Rony Pshisva & Gustavo A. Su�rez F., 2006. "Captive Markets: the Impact of Kidnappings on Corporate Investment in Colombia," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo.
    7. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    8. Suzanne Werner, 1999. "Choosing Demands Strategically," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 43(6), pages 705-726, December.
    9. Thomas Bassetti & Raul Caruso & Darwin CortÔøΩs, 2015. "Behavioral differences in violence: The case of intra-group differences of Paramilitaries and Guerrillas in Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo 13823, Universidad del Rosario.
    10. Scott Wolford, 2020. "War and diplomacy on the world stage: Crisis bargaining before third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 235-261, April.
    11. Thomas Bassetti & Raul Caruso & Darwin Cortes, 2015. "Behavioral differences in violence: The case of intra-group differences of Paramilitaries and Guerrillas in Colombia," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Politica Economica ispe0073, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    12. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2018. "Confronting an enemy with unknown preferences: Deterrer or provocateur?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 124-143.
    13. Rony Pshisva & Gsutavo Suarez, 2005. "Captive Markets: The Impact Of Kidnappings On Corporate Investment In Colombia," Documentos CEDE 3786, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    14. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Jelnov, Artyom & Tauman, Yair & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2017. "Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 177-189.
    16. Rony Pshisva & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2006. "'Captive markets': the impact of kidnappings on corporate investment in Colombia," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2013. "Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 29, pages 235-266.
    18. Hopfensitz, Astrid & Miquel-Florensa, Josepa, 2014. "How forced displacement flows affect public good contributions: The social consequences of conflict in Colombia," TSE Working Papers 14-463, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2015.
    19. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    20. Mauricio SANTAMARIA SALAMANCA & Norberto ROJAS DELGADILLO & Gustavo HERN�NDEZ DIAZ, 2013. "Crecimiento económico y Conflicto Armado en Colombia," Archivos de Economía 11201, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N46 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Latin America; Caribbean

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:23:y:2017:i:2:p:7:n:1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.