IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v31y2025i3p259-303n1003.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information and Risk Preference: An Analysis of Brinkmanship

Author

Listed:
  • Hwang Joongsan

    (1877 University of Colorado Boulder , Boulder, CO, USA)

Abstract

This paper explains brinkmanship with infinitely repeated veto bargaining games, where players have private information. In the basic model, the paper solves for two types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. First, in Risk-Taking Equilibria (RTE), the proposer is more risk-seeking and engages in brinkmanship. Secondly, in Risk-Avoiding Equilibria (RAE), the proposer is more risk-averse and does not engage in it. Brinkmanship is likely to fail because the vetoer knows that once she succumbs to brinkmanship, the proposer will learn her weakness and make her worse offers. In the extended model, thresholds represent preconditions for negotiation. In the Threshold Pooling Equilibria (TPE) for the extended model, the vetoer sets a threshold and sticks to it. This way, the vetoer may increase her expected utility.

Suggested Citation

  • Hwang Joongsan, 2025. "Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information and Risk Preference: An Analysis of Brinkmanship," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 31(3), pages 259-303.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:31:y:2025:i:3:p:259-303:n:1003
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2025-0020
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2025-0020
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/peps-2025-0020?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:31:y:2025:i:3:p:259-303:n:1003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.