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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003.
"Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 911-929, November.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vielle, 2002. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Discussion Papers 1355, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Nicolas, VIEILLE & Eilon, SOLAN, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Les Cahiers de Recherche 772, HEC Paris.
- Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan, 2003. "Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games," Post-Print hal-00464953, HAL.
- Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Deterministic Multi-Player Dynkin Games," Working Papers hal-00591681, HAL.
- Gallice, Andrea, 2008. "Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game," MPRA Paper 10256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bossert, Walter & Brams, Steven J. & Kilgour, D. Marc, 2002.
"Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-202, August.
- BOSSERT, Walter & BRAMS, Steven J. & KILGOUR, D. Marc, 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bossert, W. & Brams, S.J. & Kilgour, D.M., 2000. "Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?," Cahiers de recherche 2000-15, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2013.
"The robustness of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend’ alliances,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(4), pages 937-956, April.
- David Rietzke & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Robustness of ‘Enemy-of-My-Enemy-is-My-Friend’ Alliances," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1258, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- repec:eee:ejores:v:264:y:2018:i:1:p:46-54 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
KeywordsTruel; games of timing; backward induction; Prisoners' Dilemma;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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