IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v43y2014i4p767-789.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states

Author

Listed:
  • Fedor Sandomirskiy

Abstract

The famous theorem of R. Aumann and M. Maschler states that the sequence of values of an $$N$$ N -stage zero-sum game $$\varGamma _N(\rho )$$ Γ N ( ρ ) with incomplete information on one side and prior distribution $$\rho $$ ρ converges as $$N\rightarrow \infty $$ N → ∞ , and that the error term $${\mathrm {err}}[\varGamma _N(\rho )]={\mathrm {val}}[\varGamma _N(\rho )]- \lim _{M\rightarrow \infty }{\mathrm {val}}[\varGamma _{M}(\rho )]$$ err [ Γ N ( ρ ) ] = val [ Γ N ( ρ ) ] - lim M → ∞ val [ Γ M ( ρ ) ] is bounded by $$C N^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$ C N - 1 2 if the set of states $$K$$ K is finite. The paper deals with the case of infinite $$K$$ K . It turns out that, if the prior distribution $$\rho $$ ρ is countably-supported and has heavy tails, then the error term can be of the order of $$N^{\alpha }$$ N α with $$\alpha \in \left( -\frac{1}{2},0\right) $$ α ∈ - 1 2 , 0 , i.e., the convergence can be anomalously slow. The maximal possible $$\alpha $$ α for a given $$\rho $$ ρ is determined in terms of entropy-like family of functionals. Our approach is based on the well-known connection between the behavior of the maximal variation of measure-valued martingales and asymptotic properties of repeated games with incomplete information. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2014. "Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 767-789, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:767-789
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0404-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-013-0404-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-013-0404-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. MERTENS , Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part B : The Central Results," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Mertens, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1976. "The normal distribution and repeated games," LIDAM Reprints CORE 312, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Fabien Gensbittel, 2015. "Extensions of the Cav( u ) Theorem for Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(1), pages 80-104, February.
    4. Bernard de Meyer, 1998. "The maximal variation of a bounded martingale and the central limit theorem," Post-Print hal-00259720, HAL.
    5. Bernard de Meyer, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Post-Print hal-00625669, HAL.
    6. DE MEYER , Bernard, 1993. "Repeated Games and the Central Limit Theorem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1993003, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. DE MEYER, Bernard, 1996. "The Maximal Variation of a Bounded Martingale and the Central Limit Theorem," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    8. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    9. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1995. "Incomplete Information Games and the Normal Distribution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1995020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. MERTENS , Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part A : Background Material," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    11. De Meyer, Bernard, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
    12. Bernard de Meyer, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00625669, HAL.
    13. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1977. "The maximal variation of a bounded martingale," LIDAM Reprints CORE 309, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    14. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1971. "The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with lack of information on both sides," LIDAM Reprints CORE 154, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    15. Bernard de Meyer, 1998. "The maximal variation of a bounded martingale and the central limit theorem," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00259720, HAL.
    16. MERTENS, Jean-François & SORIN , Sylvain & ZAMIR , Shmuel, 1994. "Repeated Games. Part C : Further Developments," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1994022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2018. "On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 180-198, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2018. "On Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information and Asymptotically Bounded Values," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 180-198, March.
    2. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    3. Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.
    4. Fabien Gensbittel, 2015. "Extensions of the Cav( u ) Theorem for Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(1), pages 80-104, February.
    5. De Meyer, Bernard, 2010. "Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
    6. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric, 2013. "Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 103-120.
    7. Fabien Gensbittel & Christine Grün, 2019. "Zero-Sum Stopping Games with Asymmetric Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 44(1), pages 277-302, February.
    8. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer & Dinah Rosenberg & Nicolas Vieille, 2016. "Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 41(1), pages 49-71, February.
    9. Domansky, V. & Kreps, V., 2011. "Game Theoretic Bidding Model: Strategic Aspects of Price Formation at Stock Markets," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 11, pages 39-62.
    10. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer, 2012. "Games with Incomplete Information in Continuous Time and for Continuous Types," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 206-227, June.
    11. Pintér, Miklós & Udvari, Zsolt, 2011. "Generalized type spaces," MPRA Paper 34107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. VIEILLE, Nicolas & ROSENBERG, Dinah & SOLAN, Eilon, 2002. "Stochastic games with a single controller and incomplete information," HEC Research Papers Series 754, HEC Paris.
    13. Hadiza Moussa Saley & Bernard De Meyer, 2003. "On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 31(2), pages 285-319.
    14. Adlakha, Sachin & Johari, Ramesh & Weintraub, Gabriel Y., 2015. "Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 269-316.
    15. Abraham Neyman, 2012. "The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 195-207, February.
    16. Matthijs van Veelen, 2002. "Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-111/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Abraham Neyman, 2013. "The Maximal Variation of Martingales of Probabilities and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Journal of Theoretical Probability, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 557-567, June.
    18. SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Loss aversion in repeated games," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    19. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    20. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Repeated games with incomplete information; Error term ; Bayesian learning; Maximal variation of martingales; Entropy; C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:767-789. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.