Repeated Games. Part C : Further Developments
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- Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.
- Gábor Lugosi & Shie Mannor & Gilles Stoltz, 2008.
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INFORMS, vol. 33(3), pages 513-528, August.
- Gabor Lugosi & Shie Mannor & Gilles Stoltz, 2008. "Strategies for prediction under imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00124679, HAL.
- Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2014. "Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 767-789, November.
- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Rustichini, A., 1998. "Minimizing Regret : The General Case," Discussion Paper 1998-41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- SHALEV, Jonathan, 1998. "Loss aversion in repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers 1998014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Pintér, Miklós & Udvari, Zsolt, 2011. "Generalized type spaces," MPRA Paper 34107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Common priors for generalized type spaces," MPRA Paper 34118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Chen, Yi-Chun, 2010. "Universality of the Epstein-Wang type structure," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 389-402, January.
- Matthijs van Veelen, 2002. "Altruism, Fairness and Evolution: the Case for Repeated Stochastic Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-111/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Heifetz, Aviad & Samet, Dov, 1998. "Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily High Rank," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 260-273, February.
- Pintér, Miklós, 2011. "Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper 38499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- repec:wsi:igtrxx:v:16:y:2014:i:01:n:s0219198914400039 is not listed on IDEAS
- Domansky, V. & Kreps, V., 2011. "Game Theoretic Bidding Model: Strategic Aspects of Price Formation at Stock Markets," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 11, pages 39-62.
- Adlakha, Sachin & Johari, Ramesh & Weintraub, Gabriel Y., 2015. "Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 269-316.
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