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A geometric Blackwell’s order

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  • Wu, Wenhao

Abstract

I present a geometric version of Blackwell’s order related to the dispersion of posterior beliefs induced by an experiment. I show that , when the posterior beliefs are affinely independent on the probability space, a more informative experiment corresponds to a more dispersed distribution of posterior beliefs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "A geometric Blackwell’s order," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:226:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001076
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111082
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Leshno, Moshe & Spector, Yishay, 1992. "An elementary proof of Blackwell's theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 95-98, December.
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    4. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
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    8. Bielinska-Kwapisz, Agnieszka, 2003. "Sufficiency in Blackwell's theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 21-25, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kitano, Wataru, 2025. "Information quality in sequential persuasion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).
    2. Wang, Han, 2025. "Contracting with heterogeneous researchers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 278-294.
    3. Kosenko, Andrew, 2024. "Beyond the Blackwell order in dichotomies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 245(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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