Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change
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- Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Tumendemberelz, Biligbaatar, 2009. "Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change," Discussion Papers 2009-09, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, 2009. "Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change," Working Papers 0905, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2006.
"What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?,"
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- Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2003. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Game Theory and Information 0312005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1989. "The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 385-391, June.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997.
"The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, "undated". "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
- Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, "undated". ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
- Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September.
More about this item
KeywordsZero-sum Bayesian games; Common prior; Value; Optimal strategies; Interim; Ex-ante; Bayesian equilibrium; Upper semi-continuity; Lower approximate semi-continuity; C72;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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