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The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets

Author

Listed:
  • Sulganik,E.
  • Zilcha,I.

Abstract

We generalize the economic decision problem considered by Blackwell(1953) in which a decision maker chooses an action after observing a signal correlated to the state of nature. Unlike Blackwell's case where the feasible set is fixed, in our framework, the feasible set of actions depends on the signal and the information system. As we indicate such a framework has more significance to economic models.

Suggested Citation

  • Sulganik,E. & Zilcha,I., 1996. "The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets," Papers 1-96, Tel Aviv.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:1-96
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward E. Schlee, 1996. "The Value of Information About Product Quality," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 803-815, Winter.
    2. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-816, July.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
    4. J. Hirshleifer, 1975. "Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 89(4), pages 519-542.
    5. Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-358, March.
    6. Robert A. Jones & Joseph M. Ostroy, 1984. "Flexibility and Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 13-32.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcoul, Philippe & Weninger, Quinn, 2008. "Search and active learning with correlated information: Empirical evidence from mid-Atlantic clam fishermen," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1921-1948, June.
    2. Eckwert, Bernhard & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1998. "The Value of Information in Some General Equilibrium Models," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275634, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Bruno Bassan & Olivier Gossner & Marco Scarsini & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Positive value of information in games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 17-31, December.
    4. Udo Broll & Bernhard Eckwert & Kit Pong Wong, 2014. "Transparency and Risk Sharing in International Trade," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(6), pages 716-731, December.
    5. Emmanuel Haven, 2008. "Private Information and the ‘Information Function’: A Survey of Possible Uses," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 193-228, March.
    6. Hiroyuki Nakata, 2011. "Equivalent comparisons of information channels," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 559-574, October.
    7. Broll, Udo & Eckwert, Bernhard & Eickhoff, Andreas, 2012. "Financial intermediation and endogenous risk in the banking sector," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1618-1622.
    8. Alfred Müller & Marco Scarsini, 2002. "Even Risk-Averters may Love Risk," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 81-99, February.
    9. Lehrer, Ehud & Rosenberg, Dinah, 2006. "What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 343-357, June.
    10. Matthew Doyle, 2010. "Informational externalities, strategic delay, and optimal investment subsidies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 43(3), pages 941-966, August.
    11. Bertocchi, Graziella & Spagat, Michael, 1998. "Growth under uncertainty with experimentation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 209-231, September.
    12. Eckwert, Bernhard & Zilcha, Itzhak, 2001. "The Value of Information in Production Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 172-186, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION; DECISION MAKING;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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