Should Platforms be Allowed to Charge Ad Valorem Fees?
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- Zhu Wang & Julian Wright, 2018. "Should platforms be allowed to charge ad valorem fees?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(3), pages 739-760, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Mark J. Tremblay, 2020. "The Limits of Marketplace Fee Discrimination," Working Papers 20-10, NET Institute.
More about this item
Keywords
platforms; taxation; third-degree price discrimination;JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2017-04-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PAY-2017-04-02 (Payment Systems & Financial Technology)
- NEP-PUB-2017-04-02 (Public Finance)
- NEP-SEA-2017-04-02 (South East Asia)
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