IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/etbull/v3y2015i2d10.1007_s40505-014-0063-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand

Author

Listed:
  • Iñaki Aguirre

    () (University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU)

  • Simon G. Cowan

    () (University of Oxford)

Abstract

Abstract This paper presents new results on the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination under constant elasticity demand. We show that when both the share of the strong market under uniform pricing and the elasticity difference between markets are high enough, then price discrimination not only can increase social welfare but also consumer surplus. We also obtain new bounds on the welfare change for log-convex demands.

Suggested Citation

  • Iñaki Aguirre & Simon G. Cowan, 2015. "Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 329-340, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0063-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40505-014-0063-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40505-014-0063-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rabah Amir & Isabelle Maret & Michael Troege, 2004. "On Taxation Pass-Through for a Monopoly Firm," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 75-76, pages 155-172.
    2. Simon Cowan, 2007. "The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with nonlinear demand functions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(2), pages 419-428, June.
    3. W. Leontief, 1940. "The Theory of Limited and Unlimited Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 490-501.
    4. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2012. "Regulated Prices, Rent Seeking, and Consumer Surplus," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 160-186.
    5. Schmalensee, Richard, 1981. "Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
    6. John K.‐H. Quah & Bruno Strulovici, 2012. "Aggregating the Single Crossing Property," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(5), pages 2333-2348, September.
    7. E. Glen Weyl & Michal Fabinger, 2013. "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 528-583.
    8. Iñaki Aguirre, 2008. "Output and misallocation effects in monopolistic third-degree price discrimination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-11.
    9. Iñaki Aguirre, 2006. "Monopolistic price discrimination and output effect under conditions of constant elasticity demand," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(23), pages 1-6.
    10. Simon Cowan, 2012. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 333-345, June.
    11. Iñaki Aguirre & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 2010. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1601-1615, September.
    12. Schwartz, Marius, 1990. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a Welfare Result," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1259-1262, December.
    13. Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
    14. Formby, John P & Layson, Stephen K & Smith, W James, 1983. "Price Discrimination, 'Adjusted Concavity,' and Output Changes under Conditions of Constant Elasticity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(372), pages 892-899, December.
    15. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August.
    16. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1976. "Joan Robinson's Criterion for Deciding Whether Market Discriminntion Reduces Output," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 86(341), pages 96-97, March.
    17. repec:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:75-76 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Nahata, Babu & Ostaszewski, Krzysztof & Sahoo, P K, 1990. "Direction of Price Changes in Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1254-1258, December.
    19. repec:adr:anecst:y:2004:i:75-76:p:08 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Shih, Jun-ji & Mai, Chao-cheng & Liu, Jung-chao, 1988. "A General Analysis of the Output Effect under Third-Degree Price Discrimination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(389), pages 149-158, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Simon GB Cowan, 2017. "A Model of Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Positive Welfare Effects," Economics Series Working Papers 829, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. John Vickers, 2017. "Direct welfare analysis of relative price regulation," Economics Series Working Papers 828, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Simon Cowan, 2016. "Welfare-increasing third-degree price discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(2), pages 326-340, May.
    4. Takanori Adachi & Takeshi Ebina, 2016. "Log-linear demand systems with differentiated products are inconsistent with the representative consumer approach," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(1), pages 260-267.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monopoly price discrimination; Social welfare; Constant elasticity demand;

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:etbull:v:3:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-014-0063-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.