Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model
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- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Working Papers 085_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 11783, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2017.
"First‐Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 107-143, January.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001031, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen & Brooks, Benjamin A, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 10792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," CEPR Discussion Papers 11782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2016.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2015. "First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2018R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2015.
- Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
- Colin Campbell & Dan Levin, 2006. "When and why not to auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 583-596, April.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Information Design: A Unified Perspective,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Working Papers 089_2017, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2018.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2017. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2075R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2017.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2132, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Gagan Aggarwal & Kshipra Bhawalkar & Guru Guruganesh & Andres Perlroth, 2021. "Maximizing revenue in the presence of intermediaries," Papers 2111.10472, arXiv.org.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2019.
"Revenue Guarantee Equivalence,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(5), pages 1911-1929, May.
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2133, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin A & Morris, Stephen, 2018. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence," CEPR Discussion Papers 12964, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2019.
"Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(2), pages 235-274, June.
- Bergemann, Dirk & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," CEPR Discussion Papers 12240, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2017. "Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2102R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jun 2018.
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More about this item
Keywords
Optimal auction; common values; revenue maximization; revenue equivalence; rst-price auction; second-price auction; resale; posted price; maximum value game; wallet game; descending auction; local incentive constraints; global incentive constraints;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2017-01-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2017-01-01 (Microeconomics)
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