Speculation in First-Price Auctions with Resale
We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder - the speculator - has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator's expected profit equals zero. Nevertheless, the opportunity for resale can create a role for an active speculator, destroy the efficiency of the auction, and increase the initial seller's expected revenue.
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- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003.
"Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
506439000000000246, David K. Levine.
- Rod Garratt & Thomas Troger, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," Game Theory and Information 0305003, EconWPA.
- Garratt, Rod & Troger, Thomas E, 2003. "Speculation in Second-Price Auctions with Resale," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0bj7w3z6, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
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