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On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information

  • Johannes Horner

    ()

    (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

  • Dinah Rosenberg

    (Dept. of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris and GREGHEC)

  • Eilon Solan

    (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University)

  • Nicolas Vieille

    (Dept of Economics and Decision Sciences, HEC Paris and GREGHEC)

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d17a/d1737.pdf
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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1737.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Operations Research (2010), 58(4): 1107-1115
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1737
Contact details of provider: Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

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Order Information: Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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  1. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
  2. Christopher Phelan, 2001. "Public trust and government betrayal," Staff Report 283, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, . ""Who Wants a Good Reputation?''," CARESS Working Papres 98-12, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  4. Phelan, Christopher, 2006. "Public trust and government betrayal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 27-43, September.
  5. Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 581-596, December.
  6. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, March.
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