Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information
The existence of a value and optimal strategies is proved for the class of twoperson repeated games where the state follows a Markov chain independently of players’ actions and at the beginning of each stage only player one is informed about the state. The results apply to the case of standard signaling where players’ stage actions are observable, as well as to the model with general signals provided that player one has a nonrevealing repeated game strategy. The proofs reduce the analysis of these repeated games to that of classical repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, September.