Existence of optimal strategies in Markov games with incomplete information
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- Abraham Neyman, 2005. "Existence of Optimal Strategies in Markov Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Paper Series dp413, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
References listed on IDEAS
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
- Johannes Horner & Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "On a Markov Game with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1737, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Hörner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2015.
"Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 83(5), pages 1795-1848, September.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2014. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000881, David K. Levine.
- Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2013. "Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1933R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2015.
- Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.
More about this item
KeywordsRepeated games; Repeated games with incomplete information; Markov chain games;
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