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Bayesian games with nested information

Author

Listed:
  • Jacobovic, Royi

    (The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University)

  • Levy, Yehuda John

    (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

  • Solan, Eilon

    (The School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University)

Abstract

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacobovic, Royi & Levy, Yehuda John & Solan, Eilon, 0. "Bayesian games with nested information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6461
    as

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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewForthcomingFile/6461/42662/1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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