Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
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- Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Dinah Rosenberg & Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer, 2010. "Evaluating Information in Zero-Sum Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00586037, HAL.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Adam Kalai & Ehud Kalai, 2011. "Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited," Discussion Papers 1512, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- De Meyer, Bernard, 2010.
"Price dynamics on a stock market with asymmetric information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 42-71, May.
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000841, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Bernard De Meyer, 2007. "Price Dynamics on a Stock Market with Asymmetric Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1604, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
More about this item
Keywordsconcavity; Value of information; Blackwell monotonicity; concavity.; Valeur de l'information; monotonie à la Blackwell; concavité.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-03 (All new papers)
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