Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides
In a Bayesian game some players might receive a noisy signal regarding the specific game actually being played before it starts. We study zero-sum games where each player receives a partial information about his own type and no information about that of the other player and analyze the impact the signals have on the payoffs. It turns out that the functions that evaluate the value of information share two property. The first is Blackwell monotonicity, which means that each player gains from knowing more. The second is concavity on the space of conditional probabilities.
|Date of creation:||May 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2009.35 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2009|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00390625|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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