Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited
For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the present paper presents a more complete theory that expands their solution. Speci cally, it presents: (1) a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components, (2) an intuitive and computable closed-form formula for the solution, (3) an axiomatic justi cation of the solution, and (4) a generalization of the solution to games with private signals, along with an arbitration scheme that implements it. The objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2011|
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- de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2004.
"Two-person bargaining with verifiable information,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 799-813, November.
- de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers 2002063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1733, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009.
"Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Bernard De Meyer & Ehud Lehrer & Dinah Rosenberg, 2009. "Evaluating information in zero-sum games with incomplete information on both sides," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09035, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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