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“Cav u” and the dual game


  • DE MEYER, Bernard

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

  • ROSENBERG, Dinah

    (Laboratoire d'Econométrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique, Paris and Modalx, U.F.R.S.E.G.M.I, Université Paris X-Nanterre)


We give an alternative proof of a theorem of Aumann and Maschler [1] that characterizes the limit of the values of finitely repeated games with lack of information on one side as the concavification of the value of the game where none of the players has any information.

Suggested Citation

  • DE MEYER, Bernard & ROSENBERG, Dinah, 1997. "“Cav u” and the dual game," CORE Discussion Papers 1997048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997048

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Sorin, 2011. "Zero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 172-207, March.
    2. Laraki, Rida & Sorin, Sylvain, 2015. "Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    3. Pierre Cardaliaguet & Catherine Rainer, 2012. "Games with Incomplete Information in Continuous Time and for Continuous Types," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 206-227, June.
    4. R. Buckdahn & P. Cardaliaguet & M. Quincampoix, 2011. "Some Recent Aspects of Differential Game Theory," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 74-114, March.

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