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On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems

Author

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  • Rosenberg, Dinah
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Vieille, Nicolas

Abstract

We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2010. "On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems," Statistics & Probability Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(5-6), pages 381-385, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:stapro:v:80:y:2010:i:5-6:p:381-385
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Välimäki, 2000. "Experimentation in Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(2), pages 213-234.
    3. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady & Martin Cripps, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 39-68, January.
    4. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    5. Dinah Rosenberg & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2007. "Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1591-1611, November.
    6. Monica Brezzi & Tze Leung Lai, 2000. "Incomplete Learning from Endogenous Data in Dynamic Allocation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1511-1516, November.
    7. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2009. "Informational externalities and emergence of consensus," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 979-994, July.

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