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Memory and Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Sergey Kovbasyuk
  • Giancarlo Spagnolo

Abstract

In many environments, including credit and online markets, records about participants are collected, published, and erased after some time. We study the effects of erasing past records in a dynamic market where the quality of sellers follows a Markov process, and buyers leave feedback about sellers to an information intermediary. When the average quality of sellers is low, unlimited records lead to a market breakdown in the long run. We consider the information design problem and characterize information policies that can sustain trade and that maximize social welfare. These policies hide some information from the market in order to foster socially desirable experimentation. We show that these outcomes can be implemented by appropriately deleting past records. Crucially, positive and negative records play opposite roles with different intensities and must have different lengths: negative records must be deleted sufficiently late, and positive ones sufficiently early.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2024. "Memory and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(3), pages 1775-1806.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:91:y:2024:i:3:p:1775-1806.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdad067
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dominik Gutt & Jürgen Neumann & Wael Jabr & Dennis Kundisch, 2020. "The Fate of the App: Economic Implications of Updating under Reputation Resetting," Working Papers Dissertations 76, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    3. Petrikaite, Vaiva & Hämäläinen, Saara, 2018. "Mobility with private information and privacy suppression," CEPR Discussion Papers 12860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Andres Liberman & Christopher Neilson & Luis Opazo & Seth Zimmerman, 2018. "The Equilibrium Effects of Information Deletion: Evidence from Consumer Credit Markets," NBER Working Papers 25097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Monte, Daniel & Pinheiro, Roberto, 2025. "Costly information intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    6. Cahn, Christophe & Girotti, Mattia & Landier, Augustin, 2021. "Entrepreneurship and information on past failures: A natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(1), pages 102-121.
    7. Will Dobbie & Paul Goldsmith‐Pinkham & Neale Mahoney & Jae Song, 2020. "Bad Credit, No Problem? Credit and Labor Market Consequences of Bad Credit Reports," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2377-2419, October.
    8. Aleksei Smirnov & Egor Starkov, 2022. "Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under Censorship," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 506-560, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality

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