Optimal entry timing
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 116-136.
- Kolb, Aaron M., 2019. "Strategic real options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 344-383.
- van Leeuwen, Boris & Offerman, Theo & van de Ven, Jeroen, 2018. "Fight or Flight : Endogenous Timing in Conflicts," Other publications TiSEM ed32885c-3183-4eff-a0ff-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Philipp Denter & John Morgan & Dana (D.) Sisak, 2018. "Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-041/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Lang, Ruitian, 2019. "Try before you buy: A theory of dynamic information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1057-1093.
More about this item
KeywordsDynamic games; Bayesian learning; Market entry; Optimal stopping; Information economics; Continuous time;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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