IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/5911.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret

Author

Listed:
  • Gärtner, Dennis
  • Schmutzler, Armin

Abstract

We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity and to stand-alone profits, and investigate the extent to which this private information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger negotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post mechanisms, which use both players' reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and what each player will earn in each case. When the outside option of at least one player is known, the efficient merger decision can be implemented by such a mechanism under plausible budget-balance requirements. When neither outside option is known, we show that the potential for regret-free implementation is much more limited, unless the budget balance condition is relaxed to permit money-burning in the case of false reports.

Suggested Citation

  • Gärtner, Dennis & Schmutzler, Armin, 2006. "Merger Negotiations and Ex-Post Regret," CEPR Discussion Papers 5911, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5911
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=5911
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gärtner, Dennis L. & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009. "Merger negotiations and ex-post regret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1636-1664, July.
    2. Hviid, Morten & Prendergast, Canice, 1993. "Merger Failure and Merger Profitability," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 371-386, December.
    3. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2011. "Foreign direct investment and R&D-offshoring," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 134-157, January.
    4. Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2005. "Competition for Railway Markets: The Case of Baden-Württemberg," CEPR Discussion Papers 5396, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Stefan Boes, 2004. "Empirical Likelihood in Count Data Models: The Case of Endogenous Regressors," SOI - Working Papers 0404, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    7. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-1259, September.
    8. Pekka Hietala & Steven N. Kaplan & David T. Robinson, 2003. "What is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 32(3), Fall.
    9. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Auctions with Contingent Payments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 862-865, September.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
    11. Gärtner, Dennis L. & Halbheer, Daniel, 2009. "Are there waves in merger activity after all?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 708-718, November.
    12. Stefan Boes & Rainer Winkelmann, 2006. "The Effect of Income on Positive and Negative Subjective Well-Being," SOI - Working Papers 0605, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    13. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    14. John G. Riley, 1988. "Ex Post Information in Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(3), pages 409-429.
    15. Cremer, Jacques, 1987. "Auctions with Contingent Payments: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 746-746, September.
    16. Thomas Borek & Stefan Buehler & Armin Schmutzler, 2004. "Mergers under Asymmetric Information � Is there a Lemons Problem?," SOI - Working Papers 0408, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    17. Gregor Andrade & Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, 2001. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 103-120, Spring.
    18. Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003. "Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
    19. Alejandra Cattaneo & Sandra Hanslin & Rainer Winkelmann, 2007. "The Apple Falls Increasingly Far: Parent-Child Correlation in Schooling and the Growth of Post-Secondary Education in Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 143(II), pages 133-153, June.
    20. Mahler, Philippe & Winkelmann, Rainer, 2004. "Single Motherhood and (Un)Equal Educational Opportunities: Evidence for Germany," IZA Discussion Papers 1391, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    21. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2002. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1007-1033, May.
    22. Benny Moldovanu, 2002. "How to Dissolve a Partnership," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(1), pages 1-66, March.
    23. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 258-293, April.
    24. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & David T. Robinson & S. Viswanathan, 2007. "Efficient Mechanisms For Mergers And Acquisitions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 995-1035, August.
    25. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006. "The Limits of ex post Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, May.
    26. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2000. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 768-791, Winter.
    27. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
    28. Hagerty, Kathleen M. & Rogerson, William P., 1987. "Robust trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 94-107, June.
    29. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
    30. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388.
    31. Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
    32. Boes, Stefan & Lipp, Markus & Winkelmann, Rainer, 2007. "Money illusion under test," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(3), pages 332-337, March.
    33. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-361, March.
    34. Yves Schneider & Peter Zweifel, 2005. "Spatial Effects in Willingness-to-Pay: The Case of Two Nuclear Risks," SOI - Working Papers 0502, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Sep 2007.
    35. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Donja Darai & Dario Sacco & Armin Schmutzler, 2010. "Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 439-460, December.
    2. Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597.
    3. Lalive, Rafael & Schmutzler, Armin, 2008. "Exploring the effects of competition for railway markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 443-458, March.
    4. Stefan Boes, 2013. "Nonparametric analysis of treatment effects in ordered response models," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 81-109, February.
    5. Johannes Schoder & Peter Zweifel, 2008. "Managed Care Konzepte und L�sungsans�tze� Ein internationaler Vergleich aus schweizerischer Sicht," SOI - Working Papers 0801, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    6. Marcus Neureiter & Peter Nunnenkamp, 2009. "Modes of International Sourcing and the Competitiveness of Firms: An Analysis of European Survey Data," Aussenwirtschaft, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Swiss Institute for International Economics and Applied Economics Research, vol. 64(04), pages 419-429, December.
    7. Helga Fehr-Duda & Adrian Bruhin & Thomas Epper & Renate Schubert, 2010. "Rationality on the rise: Why relative risk aversion increases with stake size," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 147-180, April.
    8. Lukas Steinmann & Harry Telser & Peter Zweifel, 2005. "The Impact of Aging on Future Healthcare Expenditure," SOI - Working Papers 0510, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2006.
    9. Falkinger, Josef, 2008. "Between Agora and Shopping Mall," IZA Discussion Papers 3524, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    10. Halbheer, Daniel & Fehr, Ernst & Goette, Lorenz & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009. "Self-reinforcing market dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 481-502, November.
    11. Gärtner, Dennis L. & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009. "Merger negotiations and ex-post regret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1636-1664, July.
    12. Dennis Gaertner, 2007. "Why Bayes Rules: A Note on Bayesian vs. Classical Inference in Regime Switching Models," SOI - Working Papers 0719, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    13. Dario Sacco & Armin Schmutzler, 2008. "All-Pay Auctions with Negative Prize Externalities: Theory and Experimental Evidence," SOI - Working Papers 0806, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    14. Thomas Borek & Stefan Bühler & Armin Schmutzler, 2008. "Analyzing Mergers under Asymmetric Information: A Simple Reduced-Form Approach," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-15, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    15. Adrian Bruhin, 2008. "Stochastic Expected Utility and Prospect Theory in a Horse Race: A Finite Mixture Approach," SOI - Working Papers 0803, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    16. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
    17. Sandra Hanslin, 2008. "The effect of trade openness on optimal government size under endogenous firm entry," SOI - Working Papers 0802, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.
    18. Hans Gersbach & Armin Schmutzler, 2006. "A Product-Market Theory of Industry-Specific Training," SOI - Working Papers 0610, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    asymmetric information; efficient mechanisms; interdependent valuations; mechanism design; mergers;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5911. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.