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Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination

  • Khaled Diaw

    (Tilburg University)

  • Jérôme Pouyet

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X)

Nous considérons une firme qui génère un risque pour l'environnement via son activité industrielle et qui a une information privée à la fois sur son effort de précaution et sur le montant de ses actifs. Nous étudions l'interaction entre l'audit ex ante de l'effort de précaution par un régulateur et la vérification ex post de la capacité financière par un juge en cas d'accident. Du point de vue des incitations, les deux instruments sont utiles. Le policy-mix optimal dépend de la règle gouvernant l'intervention ex post et de l'efficience de l'intervention ex ante.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00243025.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00243025
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  5. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "On the Optimality of Privacy in Sequential Contracting," Discussion Papers 1394, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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  9. Eugenio J. Miravete & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2003. "Estimating Markups under Nonlinear Pricing Competition," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  10. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Jean-Charles Rochet & Lars A. Stole, 2002. "Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 277-311.
  12. Holmes, Thomas J, 1989. "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 244-50, March.
  13. Ivaldi, M. & Martimort, D., 1992. "Competition Under Nonlinear Pricing," Papers 93.288, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  14. Bond, E.W. & Gresik, T.A., 1998. "Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals," Papers 8-98-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  15. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
  16. Severin Borenstein, 1985. "Price Discrimination in Free-Entry Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 380-397, Autumn.
  17. Miravete, Eugenio J, 2004. "Are all those Calling Plans Really Necessary? The Limited Gains From Complex Tariffs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4237, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Borenstein, Severin & Rose, Nancy L, 1994. "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 653-83, August.
  19. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
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  21. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
  22. Miravete, Eugenio J & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003. "Competitive Non-Linear Pricing in Duopoly Equilibrium: The Early US Cellular Telephone Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 4069, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2009. "Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common-agency games," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(1), pages 78-102.
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