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Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals

Author

Listed:
  • Bond, E.W.
  • Gresik, T.A.

Abstract

In this paper, the authors use a model of tax competition to study the role of information sharing in common agency problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Bond, E.W. & Gresik, T.A., 1998. "Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals," Papers 8-98-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pensta:8-98-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Diaw, K. & Pouyet, J., 2004. "The Dilemma of Tax Competition : How (not) to attract (Inefficient) Firms?," Discussion Paper 2004-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2004. "Competition, Incomplete Discrimination and Versioning," Working Papers 2004-20, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Khaled Diaw & Jérôme Pouyet, 2005. "Information, competition and (In) complete discrimination," Working Papers hal-00243025, HAL.
    4. Thomas A. Gresik, 2001. "The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 800-838, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    INFORMATION ; GAME THEORY ; ASYMETRIC INFORMATION;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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