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Optimal contract with private information on cost expectation and variability

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Danau

    (UFR de sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM-CNRS, UMR 6211)

  • Annalisa Vinella

    (Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy)

Abstract

A multidimensional-and-sequential screening problem arises in a framework where the agent is privately informed about expected cost and cost variability and, subsequently, learns the realized cost as well. As the principal's marginal surplus function becomes less concave/more convex, the optimal mechanism reflects progressively stronger incentives to mimic less inefficient types, and to misrepresent the cost variability relative to the expected cost. When the principal's knowledge imperfection about the cost variability is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost, quantities are pooled with respect to the former for a high-expected-cost agent. A low-expected-cost agent is not assigned the first-best output at least in some state of nature.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2012. "Optimal contract with private information on cost expectation and variability," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201228, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201228
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    File URL: https://crem-doc.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2012/201228.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multidimensional screening; Sequential screening; Expected cost; Cost variability; Marginal surplus function;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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