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Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives

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  • Spiegel, Y.
  • Spulber, D.F.

Abstract

The regulated firm's choice of capital structure is affected by countervailing incentives: the firm wishes to signal high value to capital markets to boost its market value while also signalling high cost to regulators to induce rate increases. When the firm's investment is large, countervailing incentives lead both high- and low-cost firms to choose the same capital structure in equilibrium, thus decoupling capital structure from private information. When investment is small or medium-sized, the model may admit separating equilibria in which high-cost firms issue greater equity and low-cost firms rely more on debt financing.
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Suggested Citation

  • Spiegel, Y. & Spulber, D.F., 1993. "Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives," Papers 93, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:bellco:93
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    Cited by:

    1. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2011. "How to talk to multiple audiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 100-122, May.
    2. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & DANIEL DANAU & ANNALISA VINELLA, 2015. "Public-Private Contracting under Limited Commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 78-110, February.
    3. Lee, Gea M., 2010. "Optimal collusion with internal contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 646-669, March.
    4. James E. Prieger, 2005. "Endogenous Regulatory Delay and the Timing of Product Innovation," Working Papers 54, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Bernardo Bortolotti & Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi & Yossi Spiegel, 2011. "Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 517-564, June.
    6. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
    7. James E. Prieger, 2003. "The Timing of Product Innovation and Regulatory Delay," Working Papers 19, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Clive J Stones, "undated". "Risk Sharing, the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm," Discussion Papers 05/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
    9. Arve, Malin, 2014. "Procurement and predation: Dynamic sourcing from financially constrained suppliers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 157-168.
    10. Gea M. Lee, 2004. "Collusion with Internal Contracting," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 693, Econometric Society.
    11. Helder Valente, 2003. "Financial Strategies in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): The Case of Regulated Firms," CEF.UP Working Papers 0307, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    12. Kashi, Bahman, 2015. "Risk management and the stated investment costs by independent power producers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 660-668.
    13. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
    14. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & FLÁVIO MENEZES & MATTHEW RYAN, 2015. "Default and Renegotiation in Public-Private Partnership Auctions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 49-77, February.
    15. Spiegel, Yossef, 1997. "The choice of technology and capital structure under rate regulation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 191-216, April.
    16. Carlos Pérez Montes, 2011. "Optimal capital structure and Regulatory Control," Working Papers 1128, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    17. Prieger, James E., 2007. "Regulatory delay and the timing of product innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 219-236, April.
    18. G. Fellows, 2015. "The capital structure of a firm under rate of return regulation: durability and the yield curve," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(3), pages 273-299, June.
    19. Spiegel, Yossi, 2002. "Reply to Kai-Uwe Kuhn's comment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 279-281, February.
    20. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
    21. Georges Assaf, A. & Gillen, David, 2012. "Measuring the joint impact of governance form and economic regulation on airport efficiency," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 220(1), pages 187-198.
    22. Pérez Montes, Carlos, 2013. "Regulatory bias in the price structure of local telephone service," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 462-476.
    23. Sanyal, Paroma & Bulan, Laarni T., 2011. "Regulatory risk, market uncertainties, and firm financing choices: Evidence from U.S. Electricity Market Restructuring," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 248-268, June.

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