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Mass media and political accountability

Author

Listed:
  • Besley, Timothy
  • Burgess, Robin
  • Pratt, Andrea

Abstract

Mass media can play a key role in enabling citizens to monitor the actions of incumbents and to use this information in their voting decisions. This can lead to government which is more accountable and responsive to its citizens' needs. In spite of the intuitive plausibility of the proposition, there is comparatively little work in political economy literature that scrutinises the role and effectiveness of the media in fulfilling this function. A literature, however, is emerging which focuses attention on the importance of the so-called 'fourth estate of government' in the policy process. A key feature of the approach taken here is to focus on incentives the media have to produce and disseminate information.

Suggested Citation

  • Besley, Timothy & Burgess, Robin & Pratt, Andrea, 2002. "Mass media and political accountability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35988, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:35988
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35988/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    2. Hoberg, George, 1991. "Sleeping with an Elephant: The American Influence on Canadian Environmental Regulation," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(01), pages 107-131, January.
    3. Macey, Jonathan R, 1992. "Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 93-110, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Potter, Philip B. K. & Baum, Matthew A., 2014. "Information, Popular Constraint, and the Democratic Peace," Working Paper Series rwp14-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay, 2006. "Knowledge-Driven Economic Development," Economics Series Working Papers 267, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. repec:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/693137 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Sobbrio, Francesco & Navarra, Pietro, 2010. "Electoral participation and communicative voting in Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 185-207, June.
    5. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
    6. Kaye, Robert, 2003. "Regulating parliament: the regulatory state within Westminster," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 35999, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Dutta, Nabamita & Roy, Sanjukta, 2016. "The interactive impact of press freedom and media reach on corruption," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 227-236.
    8. Alexandre Mas, 2017. "Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(5), pages 1683-1721.
    9. Islam, Roumeen, 2003. "do more transparent government govern better?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3077, The World Bank.
    10. repec:eee:socmed:v:190:y:2017:i:c:p:237-246 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Desai, Raj M. & Olofsgard, Anders, 2006. "The political advantage of soft budget constraints," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 370-387, June.
    12. Houston, Joel F. & Lin, Chen & Ma, Yue, 2011. "Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 326-350, May.
    13. repec:eee:riibaf:v:41:y:2017:i:c:p:79-89 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2009. "Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias," MPRA Paper 18215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Baron, David P., 2003. "Competing for the Public through the News Media," Research Papers 1808, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    16. Grottke Markus & Kittl Maximilian, 2013. "Komplexität im Steuerrecht – Zentrale politökonomische Theorien im Lichte einer empirischen Ursachenforschung mit Hilfe von Process Tracing / Tax complexity in emergence – pivotal political-economic t," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 64(1), pages 163-194, January.
    17. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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