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State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture

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  • Paul Aligica
  • Vlad Tarko

Abstract

The notion that state capitalism (an economic system “in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain”) is a new form of capitalism emerging in the global arena has been recently advanced by several authors. This paper explores the problem of the nature of this system in the light of these claims to novelty. What are its main features as described by these authors? Is state capitalism distinctive from other forms of capitalism or other types of economic systems? Are we really witnessing the emergence of a new type of economic system? To address such questions the paper starts by trying to place the model of state capitalism within the traditional comparative economic systems framework. The inconclusive result leads to a different approach in which the concept of rent-seeking society is used to underlie the structural similarities between mercantilism, real life socialism and state capitalism. The article argues that the conjecture that what has been labeled “state capitalism” is yet another form of rent-seeking system is both robust and worth further investigating. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2012. "State capitalism and the rent-seeking conjecture," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 357-379, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:23:y:2012:i:4:p:357-379
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-012-9128-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Dragos Aligica & Vlad Tarko, 2014. "Crony Capitalism: Rent Seeking, Institutions and Ideology," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(2), pages 156-176, May.
    2. Belesky, Paul, 2016. "Rice, politics and power: the political economy of food insecurity in East Asia," Thesis Commons hn264, Center for Open Science.
    3. Sękowski, Stefan, 2021. "The pros and cons of rent-seeking: Political rent in various research paradigms," Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Public Policy Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, July.
    4. Belesky, Paul, 2015. "Towards a New Political Economy of Food: State Capitalism and the Emergence of Neomercantilism in the Global Food System," Thesis Commons 8ckgz, Center for Open Science.
    5. Lotta Moberg & Vlad Tarko, 2021. "Special economic zones and liberalization avalanches," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 120-139, February.
    6. Cohen, Solomon I., 2014. "Different institutional behavior in different economic systems: Theory and evidence on diverging systems worldwide," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 221-242.
    7. John Garen, 2020. "The Allocation and Exchange of Property Rights as a Way to Understand Comparative Economic Systems and Managerial Economics," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 35(Winter 20), pages 43-59.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State capitalism; Mercantilism; Rent-seeking; Comparative economic systems; Political economy; P10; P16; P20; P51; D72; F59;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other

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