Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition
Many have observed that political candidates running for election are often purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In this paper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model the electoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In the first stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies, and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity. Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustained in equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variable for the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the same electoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.
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| Length: | |
| Date of creation: | Jan 1994 |
| Date of revision: | Apr 1996 |
| Handle: | RePEc:upf:upfgen:162 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Rebecca B. Morton & Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters," Discussion Papers 1023, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson Roger B., 1993.
"Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,"
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