On the Economic Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
What features of the dispute settlement process help governments live up to their trade liberalization commitments? Exploiting data on GATT/WTO trade disputes initiated and completed between 1973 and 1998, this paper identifies economic and institutional determinants that help defendant governments commit to liberalizing trade. We find substantial evidence consistent with the theory that power measures, including threat of retaliation by the plaintiff, yield credibility to allow defendant governments to live up to their commitments. We find only limited evidence, however, that particular procedural or institutional features beyond the basic GATT/WTO dispute settlement forum itself contributed to the successful economic resolution of trade disputes. © 2004 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 86 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:86:y:2004:i:3:p:811-823. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.