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Will GATT enforcement control antidumping?

Author

Listed:
  • Finger, J. Michael
  • Fung, K.C.
  • DEC

Abstract

The authors try to gauge why the GATT dispute settlement process has, to date, been so ineffective in disciplining the use of antidumping measures. Focusing on the five cases in which panels have completed their findings and recommendations, the authors identify the sources of this ineffectiveness and evaluate the likelihood that the process will become effective. Changing the bureaucratic momentum of the system is possible, they contend, but would not be easy. It would require greater resolve by member countries'GATT delegates to see that GATT rules are enforced - a greater willingness to stand up to domestic pressures to bend GATT rules to suit the demands of national politics. Changing the legal momentum of the system will be even more difficult, say the authors. Interpreting the GATT in a legalistic way compels one to interpret it as a statement of rights to impose antidumping duties. The substantive criteria for action are broad: the injury concept justifies protection for anyone to whom it is worth the time to ask for it. The constraints onantidumping actions - loopholes and procedural technicalities - are artificial, so legal reform means getting rid of them. Where do the GATT articles on trade remedies lead? The authors contend that if you take a legalistic view, you come to a protectionist conclusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, J. Michael & Fung, K.C. & DEC, 1993. "Will GATT enforcement control antidumping?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1232, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. M. Finger, 1981. "The Industry-Country Incidence of "Less than Fair Value" Cases in US Import Trade," NBER Chapters,in: Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: The Experience of Latin America, pages 260-279 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Prusa & Susan Skeath, 2002. "The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 138(3), pages 389-413, September.
    2. Finger, J. Michael, 1998. "GATT experience with safeguards - making economic and political sense of the possibilities that the GATT allows to restrict imports," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2000, The World Bank.
    3. P. Tharakan & David Greenaway & Joe Tharakan, 1998. "Cumulation and injury determination of the European community in antidumping cases," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 134(2), pages 320-339, June.
    4. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    5. Finger,J. Michael & Francis Ng & Wangchuk, Sonam, 2001. "Antidumping as safeguard policy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2730, The World Bank.

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