The Political Economy of EC Protectionism: National Protectionism Based on Article 115, Treaty of Rome
This paper investigates the trade policy of the EC, based on Art. 115, Treaty of Rome. It is shown that politicians and bureaucrats take advantage of the significant discretion the procedure allows. Political and bureaucratic self-interest are the underlying motives for national trade barriers against nonmember countries based on Art. 115. The empirical results support this hypothesis. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 72 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:72:y:1991:i:1:p:37-50. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.