Economic Efficiency, Political Institutions and Policy Analysis
The authors focus on the implications for policy research and advice if they adopt either a strictly economic perspective or if they extend theoretical modeling to include political behavior and to account for the existence of political institutions. They examine the nature of policy analysis in models centering on a social planner, on expected vote maximization, and on majoritarian choices subject to possible instability of outcomes. Special attention is given to the treatment of project evaluation, budget size, tax structure and reform in the different perspectives, and to the meaning of efficiency in a context that includes political behavior and institutions. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
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|Date of creation:||1991|
|Date of revision:||1993|
|Publication status:||Published: – revised version in Kyklos, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1993), pp. 3–25|
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