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Tariff protection in developed and developing countries: a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis


  • Conybeare, John A. C.


Four political models (the international system, rational domestic economic policy, intragovemmental politics, and interest group influence) may explain the cross-national structure of average nominal levels of tariffs on manufactures. Using available data measuring or approximating the explanatory variables for the time periods 1902 and 1971, selected hypotheses were tested in regression equations. The 1971 tariff levels are best predicted by rational economic policy variables while for 1902, international power variables provide the best predictions of the tariff. In general, the causal forces influencing the cross-national pattern of tariff levels appear to have shifted in the 20th century from those indicating international power to those measuring domestic politico-economic development. These results provide evidence relevant to some of the general propositions about size and development suggested by the contemporary political economy literature. They also lend support to those who argue that a rising level of international interdependence has resulted in long-term changes in the pattern of influences on national public policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Conybeare, John A. C., 1983. "Tariff protection in developed and developing countries: a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(03), pages 441-467, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:37:y:1983:i:03:p:441-467_03

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2003. "Was It Stolper-Samuelson, Infant Industry or Something Else? World Trade Tariffs 1789-1938," NBER Working Papers 9656, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Belfrage, Carl-Johan, 2004. "Special Interest Politics and Trade Policy – An Empirical Challenge," Working Papers 2005:31, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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