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Trade Barriers And Trade Flows Across Countries And Industries

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  • Jong-Wha Lee
  • Phillip Swagel

Abstract

We use disaggregated data on trade flows, production, and trade barriers for 41 countries in 1988 to examine the political and economic determinants of nontariff barriers, as well as the impact of protection (both tariff and nontariff) on trade flows. We use an econometric framework that allows for the simultaneous determination of trade barriers and trade flows. Our results are consistent with political-economy theories of the determinants of protection: even after accounting for industry- and country-specific factors, nations tend to protect industries that are weak, in decline, politically important, or threatened by import competition, but provide less protection to industries in which exports are important. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Suggested Citation

  • Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, 2000. "Trade Barriers And Trade Flows Across Countries And Industries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(3), pages 372-382, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:79:y:2000:i:3:p:372-382
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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