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A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors

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  • Carlsson, Hans

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  • Carlsson, Hans, 1991. "A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1487-1496, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:5:p:1487-96
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Park, Joon Y. & Phillips, Peter C.B., 1989. "Statistical Inference in Regressions with Integrated Processes: Part 2," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(01), pages 95-131, April.
    2. Park, Joon Y. & Phillips, Peter C.B., 1999. "Asymptotics For Nonlinear Transformations Of Integrated Time Series," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 269-298, June.
    3. Peter C.B. Phillips & Victor Solo, 1989. "Asymptotics for Linear Processes," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 932, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Peter C.B. Phillips & Joon Y. Park, 1998. "Nonstationary Density Estimation and Kernel Autoregression," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1181, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Juana Santamaria-Garcia, 2004. "Equilibrium Selection In The Nash Demand Game. An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-34, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    3. Dutta, Rohan, 2012. "Bargaining with revoking costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 144-153.
    4. Hom M Pant, 1996. "Endogenous Behaviour of the Tariff Rate in a Political Economy," International Trade 9609001, EconWPA, revised 01 Oct 1996.
    5. Andersson, O. & Argenton, C. & Weibull, J., 2010. "Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (Revision of DP 2010-70)," Discussion Paper 2010-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Carlsson, Hans & Dasgupta, Sudipto, 1997. "Noise-Proof Equilibria in Two-Action Signaling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 432-460, December.
    7. Carlsson, Hans & Ganslandt, Mattias, 1998. "Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 23-34, July.
    8. Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen, 2013. "Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 211-214.
    9. Yi, Kang-Oh, 1999. "A Quantal Response Equilibrium Model of Order Statistic Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt4771x1j2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    10. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen, 2010. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 0726, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 08 Apr 2010.
    11. Van Essen, Matthew, 2014. "A Simple Bargaining Model where Parties Make Errors," MPRA Paper 58952, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
    13. Murali Agastya, 1995. "An Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Game Theory and Information 9503001, EconWPA.
    14. Evans Robert, 2003. "A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-8, January.
    15. David Malueg, 2010. "Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash Demand Game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 243-270, August.

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