On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms
The fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for different commodities suggests that the choice of policy instrument may reflect the goals of agricultural policy makers. This paper uses the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine the motivations underlying the choice of agricultural policy mechanisms. It is found that supply control mechanisms favor high-cost producers and the budget, while mechanisms resulting in overproduction favor low-cost producers.
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Volume (Year): 74 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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